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CHAPTER 22 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
JOHN G. RYAN 
§22.1. Introduction. On August 13, 1970, Massachusetts Governor 
Francis W. Sargent signed the country's first "no-fault" auto insurance 
law,' to be effective January 1, 1971. The change was a significant over-
haul in a 43-year-old compulsory liability system that had been a center 
of public controversy for a number of years. The change also marked 
an end- or at least a pause- in four years of sometimes bitter debate 
over the no-fault concepts that had first captured public attention in 
Massachusetts in 1967 when the Massachusetts House of Representa-
tives passed, and the Senate rejected, the Keeton-O'Co111nell "Basic 
Protection Plan. "2 
For a time after enactment of the new law, there was some doubt 
as to whether it would be implemented and a likelihood that, if it 
were, a state insurance fund might be required to make it work. These 
concerns stemmed from provisions of two sections of the original act3 
which led insurance companies, who had been major proponents of 
the basic change, to threaten withdrawal from the Massachusetts auto 
insurance market if they were allowed to stand. The first were provi-
sions of Section 6 of the act ordering reductions of at least 15 percent 
in the rates for all types of auto insurance. The second weJre provisions 
of Section 8 calling for the automatic renewal of all auto policies "ex-
cept for fraud, conviction for use of unlawful drugs or d:riving under 
the influence of liquor, or nonpayment of premiums." 
Insurance industry objections to the automatic renewal provisions 
were apparently overcome just 11 days after the no-fault law was signed 
with enactment of Chapter 744 of the Acts of 1970, which Jrevised those 
provisions and added other features to the new plan. Company concern 
over the rate-cut provisions was ended by a decision of rhe Supreme 
Judicial Court4 holding the cuts ordered on property damage coverage 
JoHN G. RYAN is associated with the Boston and Worcester firm of Morrison, 
Mahoney and Miller. While preparing this chapter, Mr. Ryan served as Special 
Counsel to Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner C. Eugene Farnam. 
§22.1. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 744. 
2 House Bill 1844 (1967). See Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection for the 
Traffic Victim (1966); 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.8. 
3 Acts of 1970, c. 670. 
4 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 1970 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1411, 263 N,E.2d 698. 
1
Ryan: Chapter 22: No-Fault Automobile Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
§22.3 NO-FAULT AtJ'tOMOBIU: INStJRANCtt 531 
confiscatory and unconstitutional, and by a similar decision by a 
single Justice5 affecting the cuts ordered for fire, theft, comprehensive 
and collision coverages. 
The no-fault idea will be tested in practice in Massachusetts in 1971. 
If the plan succeeds as its proponents suggest it will, it may set a pat-
tern to be followed in other states. If it fails, it seems unlikely that 
such failure alone will quiet public concern over the liability system 
and its costs. Only time will prove the plan's worth. There can be no 
doubt, however, that in 1971 the auto tort practice will be changed 
materially. 
It is the objective of this chapter to explain the major features of 
the no-fault automobile insurance law. For the most part, the new 
statutes6 will be the guide. The author has, however, consulted the 
new auto insurance policy and other regulations approved by the 
Massachusetts Insurance Department to assist in interpretation. The 
hope is that the explanation here will give practitioners an introduc-
tion to what in time may prove to be a sound, workable and progres-
sive answer to the long-debated auto accident reparations problem. 
A. AN OVER-ALL VIEW 
§22.2. Statutory framework. Central to a proper understanding 
of the new system is an appreciation of its basic framework. Two differ-
ent acts bring about the reform. Of the two, Chapter 670 of the Acts 
of 1970 is by far the most important, and its first five sections contain 
the only operative revisions of immediate concern. The other act, 
Chapter 744, is significant to the bar only for its Section 3 which will 
be discussed in connection with comment on the constitutional issues 
raised by the plan. 
There are three keys to understanding the new system: (I) A new 
coverage, very much like Medical Payments coverage, has been added 
to the previous compulsory bodily injury coverage; (2) This new cover-
age, called Personal Injury Protection, has been made the primary 
source of recovery for the elements of loss it embraces; and (3) The 
potential of recovering in a tort action for more than actual economic 
loss in the name of payments for pain and suffering has been restricted. 
B. THE NEw CovERAGE 
§22.3. Broadened medical payments coverage. The Acts of 1970, 
c. 670, §2, contains the basic definition of the new Personal Injury Pro-
tection (PIP) coverage which has been added to the previous compul-
5 Employer's Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, SJC Docket 
No. 69,826 Eq. This affirmed a report of a master. An appeal was taken from this 
interlocutory decree, The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1537, 265 N.E.2d 90. 
6 G.L., c. 90, §§34M-N; G.L., c. 175, §§22E-H. 
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sory liability coverage. Ignoring internal exclusions, the PIP coverage 
will: 
Pay to the named insured and members of his household, au-
thorized operators, passengers including guest occupants and any 
pedestrian struck by the insured vehicle; 
The reasonable expenses incurred within two years of the ac-
cident for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services, 
including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, 
professional nursing and funeral expenses; 
And 75 percent of wages actually lost as a result of the injury 
if the injured was employed at the time of accident, or, in the case 
of the unemployed, "actual" loss by reason of diminution of earn-
ing power; 
Plus amounts paid for ordinary and necessary services the in-
jured person would have performed for himself or members of his 
household had he not been injured; 
Up to an amount of $2000 per person; 
As a result of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death 
at any time resulting therefrom; 
Caused by accident and "not suffered intentionally"; 
While in or upon, entering into or alighting from, or being 
struck as a pedestrian by the insured vehicle; 
Without regard to negligence or gross negligence or fault of 
any kind. 
§22.4. Medical, hospital expenses, etc. Except for the wage loss 
provisions and an extension of the time limit to two years, the basic 
Personal Injury Protection coverage for hospital and medical expenses, 
etc., is nearly identical to Medical Payments coverage a1; it has been 
known in Massachusetts for a number of years. 
Construction of such potentially troublesome terms as reasonable 
expenses, incurred, necessary services and while in or upon, enter-
ing into or alighting from (shortened in the policy language, by 
way of a definition, to the more workable occupying) will be aided 
by precedents dealing with Medical Payments coverage.! Regulations 
concerning the PIP deductibles made by the Massachusetts Insurance 
Department supply a workable definition of the act's undefined "mem-
bers of the insured's or obligor's household."2 Few practical problems 
will be experienced in giving meaning to the expenses of this type that 
are recoverable on the no-fault basis. 
§22.4. 1 For general survey, see 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §§4896 
et seq. (1941). 
2 That definition is "Those persons related by blood or marriage, who dwell as a 
family under one roof, domestic servants, long·term guests (e.g., a foreign exchange 
student) and student members of the family who are away from home attending 
college or school. The term 'household' does not include boarders or lodgers who 
are not related to the insured." 
3
Ryan: Chapter 22: No-Fault Automobile Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
§22.6 NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 533 
§22.5. Wage loss benefit in general. The major difference between 
Medical Payments coverage and the new Personal Injury Protection 
coverage resides in the provisions dealing with wage loss. Medical Pay-
ments coverage simply did not deal with lost earnings. PIP does, and 
because it breaks new ground in this area, there will probably be more 
coverage questions relating to the wage loss provisions than any other 
part of the new plan. 
The coverage treats the employed and the unemployed in different 
ways. Analysis suggests that the draftsmen attempted to fashion a no-
fault wage loss benefit for the employed that would avoid some prac-
tical problems of the traditional rule of damages expressed in Doherty 
v. Ruiz.1 Accordingly, a fairly clear statutory benefit for wage loss is 
provided for the employed to replace the traditional "diminution of 
earning power" with the more practical "average weekly wage" con-
cept of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The benefit for the unem-
ployed also modifies the "diminution of earning power" test of the 
cited cases. 
Interestingly, both the employed and the unemployed are addition-
ally entitled to recover on a no-fault basis under PIP "for payments 
in fact made to others, not members of the injured person's household 
and reasonably incurred in obtaining from those others ordinary and 
necessary services in lieu of those that, had he not been injured, the 
injured person would have performed not for income but for the bene-
fit of himself and for members of his household."2 
§22.6. Wage loss for the employed. Personal Injury Protection 
entitles the injured person who is employed at the time of an accident 
to recover on a no-fault basis the lesser of: 
(1) Amounts "actually lost" by reason of "inability to work and 
earn wages"; or 
(2) Seventy-five percent of his "average weekly wage" for the 
year immediately preceding the accident during such period or 
an amount that together with payments received under pro-
grams for wage continuation will provide the above 75 percent 
of average weekly wage. 
"Amounts actually lost" by reason of inability to work and earn 
wages is the starting test in each instance. This amount is then to be 
matched against "average weekly wage or salary or its equivalent for 
the year immediately preceding the accident." If amounts actually 
lost are less than the amount determined by calculating 75 percent 
of average weekly wage, then that lesser amount will be paid without 
deduction. 1£, however, wages have been increasing through the year 
immediately preceding the accident or have remained stable, then ap-
§22.5. 1 !102 Mass. 145, 18 N.E.2d 542 (19!19), followed most recently in Marston 
v. Auto Laundries, Inc., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2!1!1, 255 N.E.2d 7!10. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 670, §2. 
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plication of the 75 percent limitation will be used to determine the 
no-fault benefit. 
The test seems to be a practical one aimed at preventing inequities 
in the case of persons who have not worked for a full year immediately 
preceding the accident or who have had fluctuating earnings during 
the applicable time period. Insofar as the short-term worker is con-
cerned, it seems likely that the principles of an early workmen com-
pensation case1 can be applied to prevent any attempt to compute 
the amount due on the basis of a full year's employment. The prin-
ciple should lead to computation of the alternative to amounts 
actually lost by division of total earnings by the. number of weeks 
of actual employment. Determination of what constitutes "average 
weekly wage" (that is, tips, commissions, fringe benefits, etc.) may 
also be aided by workmen's compensation precedents. 
Once average weekly wage is determined, the amount due when 
this test is applied will vary according to whether or not the injured 
person is entitled to wages "under any program for continuation of 
said wages .... " 
One of the persistent myths about PIP is that none of the no-fault 
benefits are payable where other collateral sources, such as health in-
surance plans, etc., are available. This is not so. The PIP no-fault 
benefits for hospital and medical expenses, etc., are payable whether 
or not other insurance applies. The only area where the existence of 
other sources is significant is in the coverage for wage loss of a person 
employed at the time of an injury. The statutory "any program for the 
continuation of ... wages" will, in such a case, be the primary source 
of the employed person's wage benefit. PIP will provide only what is 
additionally needed to provide 75 percent of the average weekly wage 
during the period of disability. 
It is likely that there will be disputes as to what constitutes a wage 
continuation program within the meaning of the act. Gertrude Stein's 
famous "a rose is a rose is a rose" may be the ultimate key to interpreta-
tion of "any program" as meaning just what it says. Just such an in-
terpretation is bolstered by internal aids such as the limitation in 
Section I of Chapter 670 "to amounts [of wage] actually lost by reason 
of the accident" and by the provision of Section 4 requiring claimants 
to authorize insurers to determine whether or not "such [wage] loss 
may be reduced in whole or in part as a result of any program calling 
for the continuance of such wage, salary or earnings [sic] during ab-
sence from work." Analysis may also lead to a focus of attention on the 
term continuation with resulting interpretations holding that some 
types of accident and disability insurance plans are not properly 
within the expressed meaning. 
For practical purposes, the great majority of wage continuation plans 
are formal. Thus it should be easy enough to determine whether or not 
§22.6. 1 Rice's Case, 229 Mass. 325, 118 N.E. 674 (1918). 
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wage is continued-during absence from work because of an auto injury. 
Loss adjustment in practice will not prove as difficult as theoretical 
arguments may suggest. And; as is true of so many other open questions 
about the new system, the low limits of the no-fault benefit and the 
relationship of the insured to the insurer should combine to keep 
technical disputes at a minimum. 
Finally, insofar as wage loss of the employed is concerned, the act 
is directly responsive to criticisms of other no-fault plans that initially 
ignored the possibility that reliance on wage continuation plans might 
result in unfair exhaustion of those benefits. 
Section 2 of Chapter 670 meets this problem by providing for the 
application of any amounts saved by the auto insurer because of a 
wage continuation plan to any later injury where a wage continuation 
plan would have paid had its benefits not been used for the earlier auto 
accident. This liability of the auto insurer continues one year beyond 
its last payment of a PIP benefit. 
§22.7. "Wage" loss for the unemployed. The traditional rule1 on 
"loss by reason of diminution of earning power" has also been modi-
fied in describing the Personal Injury Protection benefit due an un-
employed person on a no-fault basis. 
The status of the injured person on the date of the accident seems 
to be the test. Presumably there would be no operative wage continua-
tion plan. The only applicable test would be amounts "actually lost 
by reason of the accident." Thus the body of law2 applicable to the 
"diminution" concept seems not intended to apply. Instead it seems 
the provisions should be read as restricting the concept in cases3 
holding that one who would not have worked if uninjured may never-
theless recover for his impaired earning power. Such a result will 
lead to paying the unemployed on a "but for" basis, that is, the amount 
he can show he would have earned in an available job but for the in-
jury. This is a break with precedent,4 but a highly practical one 
from a claims-handling standpoint. 
§22.8. Coverage extension and territorial application. The final 
paragraph of the Personal Injury Protection coverage section provides 
for payment of the plan's no-fault benefits to the insured and members 
of his household in "any case" where those persons incur a covered 
loss while occupying or being struck as a pedestrian by a vehicle not 
insured by a policy or bond providing personal injury protection, un-
less there is a tort recovery for the loss. This provision extends coverage 
for the insured and members of his household to a number of situa-
tions in which coverage would not otherwise apply. 
§22.7. 1 Doherty v. Rtliz, 302 Mass. 145, 146, 18 N.E.2d 542, 543 (1939). 
2 For a general discussion, see Martin and Hennessey, 11 Mass. Practice Series 
§246(1954). . . . . . . . .. 
3 Matloff v. Chelsea, 308 Mass. 134, 3~ N.E.2d 518 (1941); Koch v. Lynch, 247 Mass. 
459, 141 N.E.2d 677 (1924). 
4 Stynes v. Boston Elevated Ry., 206 Mass. 75, 91 N.E. 998 (1910). 
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At this point, it is important to note that PIP coverage, like the 
compulsory liability coverage, attaches to the insured vehicle. The 
insured person occupying another vehicle (that is, not his own), or 
struck by one as a pedestrian, will look to the PIP coverage on that 
vehicle for his no-fault benefits. The coverage extension :gives the in-
sured and household members the benefit of their own coverage when 
occupying or being struck by a vehicle that does not have applicable 
PIP coverage. It recognizes, however, that in such a case, the injured 
person may have a valid tort claim. Policy language approved by the 
Massachusetts Insurance Department1 clarifies the timing problem hy 
giving the insurer paying PIP benefits a right to a share in the tort 
recovery made subsequent to the no-fault recovery. 
The policy language2 also clarifies earlier doubt as to the territorial 
application of PIP by making it applicable- except toward out-of-
state pedestrians- throughout the United States, its territories and 
possessions, and Canada. 
Finally, it should be noted that, unlike compulsory liability coverage, 
the in-state PIP coverage is not restricted to the ways of the Common-
wealth and places therein to which the public has a right of access. 
§22.9. The exclusions. Two quite different classes o[ persons are 
made ineligible for the Personal Injury Protection no-fault benefits 
described: 
(1) A person entitled to payments or benefits under the provisions 
of the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act; and 
(2) Persons whose conduct contributed to their injury while operat-
ing a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth: 
(a) while under the influence of alcohol or a narcotic drug ... ; 
(b) while committing a felony or seeking to avoid lawful appre-
hension or arrest by a police officer; or 
(c) with the specific intent of causing injury or damage to himself 
or others.1 
The workmen's compensation exclusion is similar in intent to the 
exclusion from compulsory liability coverage of any employee of the 
insured entitled to workmen's compensation benefits. It helps preserve 
the exclusive nature of the workmen's compensation remedy and the 
resulting immunity of an employer from actions at law by his em-
ployees, thus satisfying the legislative intent of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act discussed in King v. Viscoloid Co. 2 Though the exclusion 
has been subject to some criticism, it seems consistent with prior law. 
§22.8. 1 See Item 12 of Conditions Applicable to Part I of Approved Standard 
Policy subparagraph (a)-
2 See Item 2 of General Conditions of Approved Standard Policy. 
§22.9. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 670, §2. There is also a general exclusion requiring the 
injury to be "caused by accident and not suffered intentionally." 
2 219 Mass. 420~_!06 ~-E~ 9.88 _(1914)_. 
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The exclusion of the second class of persons from the PIP no-fault 
benefit system is optional with insurers. Policy language containing 
such an exclusion has, however, been approved by the Massachusetts 
Insurance Department and will presumably be used in alll97l policies. 
It is important to note that the exclusion applies only where such 
persons contribute to their injury while operating an insured vehicle 
within the Commonwealth. It will have no effect upon passengers 
riding with or pedestrians struck by such an operator. Finally, although 
the lack of a PIP benefit may revive tort rights because of the nature 
of the tort exemption in the act, it is doubtful that this will have any 
practical effect since most such operators would be barred from re-
covery on a tort basis as well as on the no-fault basis. 
§22.10. Deductibles. An additional feature of Personal Injury 
Protection coverage is the availability of optional deductibles in 
amounts of $250, $500, $1000 and $2000. 'These deductibles are au-
thorized by the last two paragraphs of the Acts of 1970, c. 670, §4. 
There are two choices: (1) a deductible applicable to the policyholder 
alone; or (2) a deductible applicable to the policyholder and members 
of his household. The deductible in the chosen amount will be a 
straight deduction from the PIP no-fault payments that would other-
wise be made. The act is clear, however, that the choice of a deductible 
does not revive tort rights nor affect the restriction on the right to re-
cover for pain and suffering. 
As explained above, the PIP coverage attaches to the insured vehicle. 
Any deductible will apply only where the purchaser is occupying his 
own vehicle at the time of injury. Accordingly, no other party riding 
with the purchaser, except household members, will be subject to the 
deductible. 
§22.11. Compulsory liability coverage. As stressed at the outset, 
a proper understanding of the new no-fault auto insurance law de-
mands an appreciation of the fact that the Personal Injury Protection 
coverage available on a no-fault basis is an addition to compulsory 
liability coverage rather than a replacement of it. 
Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1970 in no way changes the requirements 
of previous law that motorists carry $5000/$10,000 bodily injury liabil-
ity coverage as a prerequisite to registration of a vehicle in Massachu-
setts. Only the insured's exposure to liability has been changed. This, 
of course, will have the practical effect of changing the circumstances 
in which the liability coverage will respond to damages, but it does 
not change the coverage itself. Uninsured motorist coverage is also un-
affected and continues to be .mandatory for all vehicles. 
C. THE ToRT ExEMPTION 
§22.12. No-fault benefits ar~ primary. As previously stated, a 
second key to understa~ding the new no~fault a1,1t0 insurance law is 
that ·the 'Personal Injury Protection coveJ:ll_.g~ ?lis :bee!l_,made the p_ri-
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mary source of recovery for the elements of loss it einbraces. It is the 
tort exemption of Chapter 670 which effectmites this policy. In direct 
terms, the Acts of 1970, c. 670; §4; provides: (1) that the PIP no-fault 
benefits are granted "in lieu of damages otherwise recoverable by the 
injured person ... in tort as ·a result of-anaccident occ:uririg within 
this commonwealth"; arid (2) that every person who would otherwise 
be liable in tort is exempt from such liability arising out of ari auto 
accident "to the extent that the injured party is ... entitled to recover 
... personal injury protection benefits ... .'~ · 
The net effect of these provisions in the usual case involving two 
Massachusetts registered and· insured vehicles is· ·that 1:he operators 
and. passengers of each vehicle will look to the insurer of the car they 
occupy for the previously described no-fault benefits. Only those in-
volved whose losses exceed the $2000 no-fault limit. will have a claim 
for additional hospital and medical expenses, wage loss benefits, etc., 
on a tort liability basis. The practical result will be an elimination of 
litigation over negligence in the great majority of cases. 
Practitioners, ·however, must clearly understand the operation of the 
exemption: first,. because there will be cases where it does not apply; 
second, because it can affect larger cases; and third, because it may 
bear directly on cases where there are Claims for damages not available 
on a no-fault basis· but which justify litigation. · · 
There is some ambiguity in the key provisions of Section 4. The 
exemption seems to apply only "to the extent" that'a no-fault benefit is 
available. It has been argried1 that, as a result, items such as the 25 
percent of wage loss not payable to the employed on a no-fault basis 
or any additional amounts of wage loss not payable because of a wage 
continuation program would therefore survive the exemption. On the 
other hand, it is possible to read the clause granting no-fault benefits 
"in lieu of damages otherwise recoverable in tart" as a legislative sub-
stitution of the defined no-fault benefit for: all tort damages of the same 
type within the specified limits. Though . there are obvious disadvan" 
tages to preserving the tort 'remedy for ~mall 'elements of loss, fairness 
seenis to dictate such continuation where rio PlP replacement benefit 
is available.2 Indeed, the act as a whole is best understood and most 
easily defended from constitutional attack by directing attention to the 
fact that the tort remedy is being eliminated only where a replacement 
benefit is provided. · 
Special elements of damage, such as unascertained future medical 
expenses and damages customarily alleged as being in aggravation, are 
not provided for on a PIP no-fault basis and, under either theory of 
statutory construction, no tort exemption would seem appllicable where 
§22.12. 1 The argument is set forth by the· author in a booklet prepared for 
the Massachusetts Association of Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers (197{)), 
2 See Keeton. and O'Connell, Basic Protection. for the -Trallic Victim 275, 276 
(1966) for justification of this result. 
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they are alleged. Damages for pain and suffering are subject to special 
statutory exclusion . 
. The tort exemption does not extend to vehicles insured by a policy 
not containing PIP. It also does not apply to accidents occurring out-
side the Commonwealth. There will therefore be actions in tort against 
vehicles such as buses, uninsured city and town vehicles, etc., that are 
registered in Massachusetts but not subject to the compulsory law. 
Massachusetts drivers will be subject to suit by out-of-state drivers 
opetating in Massachusetts and to extraterritorial actions as they are 
now. And vexatious actions without grounds will still be a part of the 
practice. 
Furthermore, the continuation of "first dollar" compulsory liability 
coverage will leave the duty of defending and settling third-party 
claims upon insurers. Presumably, there will be no change in extra-
territorial difficulties of Massachusetts drivers. Finally, under the terri-
torial extension of coverage, Massachusetts insureds and occupants of 
their vehicles will have valid PIP claims, as well as potentially valid 
tort claims, for losses they incur outside the Commonwealth. Massachu-
setts insureds and members of their households in, or struck as pedes-
trians by, vehicles not insured for PIP will have .a similar duality of 
remedy. The terms of the act suspend the PIP no-fault claim during 
the pendency of any tort actions brought as a result of such circum-
stances, and the approved policy language again solves the timing 
problem.s 
D. THE PAIN AND SUFFERING RESTRICTION 
§22.13. Broad restriction. The Acts of 1970, c. 670, §5, contains 
the restriction on an injured person's right to recover for pain and 
suffering which proponents of no-fault auto insurance identify as the 
cost-cutting part of their program. The restriction purports to apply 
(on and after January 1, 1971, the effective date of the act) to ~·any 
action of tort brought as a result of [injury] ... arising out of the own-
ership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle within this 
commonwealth by the defendant .... " 
Standing alone, the provision might be read as affecting tort actions 
wherein the cause of action arose before the act's effective date but 
which are not entered until after January 1, 1971. It also can be read 
as affecting tort actions arising after the effective date, in which there 
is no offsetting Persori~tl Injury Protection no-fault benefit provided 
to a plaintiff.1 It is submitted that the restriction plainly affects a sub-
s see Item 12 of Conditions Applicable to Part I of Approved Standard Policy 
subparagr~ph (a). 
§22.15. 1 E.g.; in the case of vehicles. exempt from the compulsory laws, actions 
against auto manufacturers, etc. · · · · · · 
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stantive right and would, on precedent,2 most probably not be. con-
strued to have a retroactive effect. 
More difficult is the question of whether the pain and suffering 
restriction is intended to apply where no-fault benefits will be unavail-
able. Certainly there is justification for the view that there has been a 
legislative determination that pain and suffering should not be com-
pensable under certain conditions and that the breadth of the restric-
tion is intentional. However, looking at the act in its entirety, in ac-
cordance with customary principles of statutory interpretation,3 one 
might reasonably support the view that the restriction is intended to 
accompany the availability of a no-fault benefit. There almost certainly 
will be court tests of this provision before there are definite answers; 
but, as is true with other questions raised by the act, an interpretation 
either way should not materially detract from the plan'~; success. 
The direct terms of the restriction are such as to limit recovery of 
damages "for pain and suffering, including mental suffering associated 
with such injury" to cases wherein either: 
(1) reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in treating such in-
jury are determined to be in excess of $500; or 
(2) expenses are not in excess of the $500, if the injury: 
(a) causes death, or 
(b) consists in whole or in part of loss of a body member or per-
manent and serious disfigurement, or 
(c) results in defined loss of sight or hearing, or 
(d) consists of a fracture. 
Again, analogies to workmen's compensation precedents will assist 
in interpretation of what those defined injuries embrace. The most 
difficult term will likely prove to be "permanent and serious disfigure-
ment," which differs significantly and apparently intentionally from 
the "bodily disfigurement" of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
What constitutes "damages for pain and suffering" may well prove 
to be the most important single question. It is clear tha1t practice will 
have to be altered in order to more precisely define in pleadings the 
elements of damages being alleged where either the dollar amount or 
type of injury precludes recovery for "pain and suffering." Again, it is 
the author's opinion that reasonable interpretations permitting re-
covery of more than actual economic loss will not thwart the act's 
purposes. 
E. OTHER NEW FEATURES 
§22.14. Claim-handling provisions. ·The Acts of 19~10, c. 670, §4, 
contains some detailed provisions on the handling of Personal Injury 
2 See, e.g., Welch v. Mayor of Taunton, 343 Mass. 485, 179 NJ~:.2d 890 (1962); 
Shelist v. Boston 'Redevelopment Authority, 350 Mass. 530, 215 N.E.2d· 748 (1966). 
3 See In re Robinson, 131 Mass. 376 {1881). 
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Protection claims that deserve the attention of the bar. Particularly 
pertinent are provisions on the detail required in reporting claims, on 
the rights given insurers to require physical examinations and to obtain 
information about wages and wage continuation plans, and the pro-
vision that an injured person's failure to cooperate may be a defense 
to an insurer. Like the Keeton-O'Connell plan, the new act also con-
templates paying losses as they are incurred in installments every 30 
days. And, significantly, claimants are given a statutory right to com-
mence an action in contract in any case in which claims remain unpaid 
30 days after receipt by the insurer of reasonable proof of the fact and 
amount of loss incurred. Any party entitled to PIP benefits is to be 
"deemed" a party to a contract with the insurer for purposes of en-
forcing this contract action, rendering the coverage a third-party bene-
ficiary contract to that extent. 
§22.15. Inter-insurer subrogation. Section 4 of the act provides 
that an insurer paying Personal Injury Protection no-fault benefits 
shall be subrogated pro tanto to the rights of any party it pays. 
In the great majority of cases, the subrogation right itself would be 
of little aid to the insurer since the tort exemption will presumably be 
a defense to an action against many of those whose fault caused the 
payment. But the act goes further and creates a new subrogation-like 
right against the insurer of the negligent but exempt party. This pro-
vision will permit insurers to proceed through arbitration or agreement 
only against one another after settlement of losses to recover payments 
made, costs of proceSsing claims, and the expenses of enforcing the new 
right. In practical effect, if insurers use this provision, the liability 
exposure of companies should remain essentially as good or bad as it 
was before enactment of the act. 
§22.16. Assigned Claims Plan. A final new concept is the creation 
of an Assigned Claims Plan to provide Personal In jury Protection 
benefits to . Massachusetts residents (with some exceptions) who are 
neither insured nor members of an insured's household when they are 
injured in such circumstances that no PIP benefits are otherwise avail-
able to them. 
Such cases would seem to be limited to persons occupying, or struck 
as pedestrians by, uninsured vehicles (uninsured at least in the sense 
that they carry no PIP coverage) and those struck by hit-and-run 
vehicles. Claimants are to be treated as though they had a PIP policy, 
and the insurer is to have all PIP insurer rights. Of prime importance 
will be the insurer's subrogation rights against the nonexempt motorist 
and its rights where tort recoveries are sought by an Assigned Claims 
Plan claimant.! 
§22.17. Continuation of coverage provision. The Acts of 1970, 
c. 744, §3, provides that compulsory liability coverage, as it existed 
§22.16. 1 See Item 12 of Conditions Applicable to Part I of Approved Standard 
Policy subparagraph (a). 
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prior to the effective date of the no~fault plan, shall continue in effect 
in the event that the Chapter 670 provisions for the tort exemption or 
the restriction on the right to: recover for pain and suffering are held 
unconstitutional. 
This is a somewhat unique "fail-safe" device that will assure Massa-
chusetts motorists that no constitutional challenge to the key features 
of the new plan will expose them to unexpected liability. As a practical 
matter, it seems unnecessary in view of the continuance of liability 
coverage that is one of the act's basic features. However, it does no 
harm to have it clearly expressed in Chapter 744. 
§22.18. Other provisions. Chapters 670 and 744 of the Acts of 
1970 contain a number of additional provisions not discussed in this 
treatment of no-fault auto insurance. They involve merit rating, 
guaranteed renewability of policies, and the mandatory offer of certain 
basic coverages to all motorists. Though obviously important to motor-
ists and to the insurance industry, these provisions cannot properly be 
considered components of the new no-fault auto insurance plan with 
which this chapter deals. They are instead separable reforms added 
to the basic reforms described. 
§22.19. Constitutional questions. No discussion of the new no-
fault law can ignore the fact that such a radical change raises con-
stitutional issues relating to jury trial, due process and equal protec-
tion. The author believes that the weight of authority1 is clearly on 
the side of the new plan's constitutionality. There is, however, little 
doubt that the constitutional issues will be litigated during the 1971 
SuRvEY year. Definite conclusions will then be available as guides to 
further improvement and progress in the law's consistent effort to 
adapt to realities and bring itself into harmony with the facts of 
modern life. 
§22.19. 1 An excellent summary is contained in U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 
Constitutional Problems in Automobile Accident Compensation Reform (USGPO 
No. 0-380-962, April, 1970). 
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